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Scholarship to-date agrees that the internet has weakened the Chinese party-state’s 
ideological and discursive hegemony over society. In this paper, we document a recent 
intervention into public discourse exercised by the Chinese state through appropriating 
and promoting a popular online catchphrase—“positive energy” (zheng nengliang). 
Analyzing the “positive energy” phenomena using Laclau and Mouffe’s theory of 
hegemony and discourse, we argue that the relative effectiveness of this hegemonic 
intervention rests on the semantic versatility of “positive energy”, which enables 
“chains of equivalence” to be established between the label’s popular meanings on the 
one hand and its propagandist meanings on the other. 
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The internet is a double-edged sword, and positive energy and negative 
energy are the two sharp edges coexisting side by side. To let positive 
energy thrive or to give negative energy free reign, the choice is 
obvious.1  
Qiushi, Organ of the Central Committee  
of Chinese Communist Party (2013) 
 
 
Contemporary China’s internet is a canivalisque space where neologisms, newfangled 
catchphrases and outlandish visual/textual memes get constantly invented, go viral, and 
then go out of fashion just as quickly.2 Scholars have shown that often such online 
discursive phenomena are sociologically significant, and analyzing them can yield 
interesting insights into contemporary Chinese politics, society, and culture.3 In this 
paper, we examine the recent catchphrase “positive energy” (zheng nengliang 正能量). 
In China, most popular internet expressions or discourses remain at lowbrow or 
“grassroots” (caogen 草根) level, and tend to be used only by ordinary netizens. What 
is extraordinary about “positive energy” is that it not only entered the Chinese 
Communist Party’s (CCP) official lexicon and discourse at the highest level (as the 
above Qiushi excerpt shows), but was indeed used publicly by Xi Jinping himself on 
multiple occasions since he became the CCP General Secretary in late 2012. We shall 
argue, much more than just another instance of Xi’s idiosyncratic fondness of using 
“hot phrases”,4 “positive energy” actually represents the most recent and a remarkable 
case of the Chinese party-state’s intervention in online media discourse. 
What is “positive energy”? One online article vaguely defines “positive energy” 
as “any uplifting power and emotion, representing hope”.5 With various origins in 
science, superstition, but most notably Hong Kong-based entertainment news, the term 
“positive energy” initially had no overt political connotation. The year 2012 saw the 
expression’s sudden rise to popularity to such an extent that a leading Chinese 
linguistics magazine rated “positive energy” No.1 among the “top ten catchphrases of 
the year”.6 Subsequently, the phrase was appropriated by the authorities, and started to 
appear frequently in various forms of official party-state communication and 
                                                        
1 http://www.qstheory.cn/zxdk/2013/201312/201306/t20130613_239399.htm (accessed 23 July 2015); authors’ 
translation. Unless otherwise stated, all translations of Chinese into English in this paper are by the authors. 
2  Gong, Haomin, and Xin Yang. "Digitized Parody: The Politics of Egao in Contemporary China." China 
Information 24, no. 1 (2010): 3-26; Meng, Bingchun. "From Steamed Bun to Grass Mud Horse: E Gao as Alternative 
Political Discourse on the Chinese Internet." Global Media and Communication 7, no. 1 (2011): 33-51; Nordin, 
Astrid, and Lisa Richaud. "Subverting Official Language and Discourse in China? Type River Crab for Harmony." 
China Information 28, no. 1 (2014): 47-67; Tang, Lijun. "The Politics of Flies: Mocking News in Chinese 
Cyberspace." Chinese Journal of Communication 6, no. 4 (2013): 482-96; Tang, Lijun, and Syamantak Bhattacharya. 
"Power and Resistance: A Case Study of Satire on the Internet." Sociological Research Online 16, no. 2 (2011); Tang, 
Lijun, and Peidong Yang. "Symbolic Power and the Internet: The Power of a 'Horse'." Media, Culture & Society 33, 
no. 5 (2011): 675-91; Yang, Peidong, Lijun Tang, and Xuan Wang. "Diaosi as Infrapolitics: Scatological Tropes, 
Identity-Making and Cultural Intimacy on China’s Internet." Media, Culture & Society 37, no. 2 (2015): 197-214. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Bandurski, David. "Meeting Mr. “Hot Phrase”." (2015) http://cmp.hku.hk/2015/02/06/38107/ 
5 http://www.chinanews.com/cul/2012/08-22/4126061.shtml (accessed 23 July 2015). 
6 http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1118565/positive-energy-chosen-number-one-chinese-catchphrase-year 
(accessed 17 August 2015). 
 3 
publication. In this official appropriation, it has come to refer to attitudes or emotions 
that are aligned with the ideological or value systems of the CCP party-state, or any 
discourses that promote such an alignment. For instance, optimistic and non-critical 
journalism that focuses on the positive and hopeful aspects of the Chinese society and 
politics is considered “positive energy”, because it encourages the mass’s identification 
with the regime. Yet, despite official appropriation, the public seems to continue 
embracing the catchphrase. As of May 2016, “positive energy”-tagged posts garnered 
some 2.1 billion views and more than two million discussion threads on Sina Weibo 
(Sina microblog) alone.7 
Early research on the possible impact of the internet on Chinese politics and 
society had revolved around the question whether internet would lead to 
democratization. It has become increasingly clear that such a hypothesis is naïve, and 
the Chinese authoritarian state has proven to be remarkably resilient in the face of the 
advent of the internet.8 This resilience is often portrayed in existing scholarship as the 
result of a paranoid censorship regime, draconian suppressions, coupled with a certain 
degree of pragmatic tolerance.9 From a Gramscian perspective, the CCP party-state is 
said to be confronted with a serious “crisis of hegemony”.10 Furthermore, facing this 
crisis, the state is perceived largely to be a defensive actor, passively reacting to the 
dynamism unleashed by the internet which chips away at its ability to control. This 
raises the interesting question as to whether, in the age of online media, an authoritarian 
state such as China’s can still proactively intervene in the mediasphere, and influence 
societal discourse more broadly. While it has been suggested that the internet may well 
become a new medium for political propaganda, and therefore serve the interests of the 
ruling authoritarian regime,11 there remains little empirical research that illustrates 
how the authoritarian state could take advantage of the new media environment. 
Equally, there is little research so far that looks at how the state could use strategies 
beyond suppression in the governing of the online mediasphere. In this context, the case 
of “positive energy” as we shall document and analyze, stands out as a rare one in which 
the CCP party-state cleverly hijacked an internet catchphrase for its own agenda of 
hegemonizing internet discourse, or at least to intervene hegemonically in it. Most 
                                                        
7 http://weibo.com/p/1008083ff5b51b3d66a706c0e3e4072b473f2d?k%EE6EADEA3EE8E83EBDEE9E87E8F
&_from_%huati_thread (accessed 14 May 2016). For an account about the phenomenon of microblogging in China, 
see Sullivan, Jonathan. "A Tale of Two Microblogs in China." Media, Culture & Society 34, no. 6 (2012): 773-83. 
8 Shie, Tamara Renee. "The Tangled Web: Does the Internet Offer Promise or Peril for the Chinese Communist 
Party?". Journal of Contemporary China 13, no. 40 (2004): 523-40; Jianhai Bi, ‘The Internet revolution in China: 
the significance for traditional forms of communist control’, International Journal 56(3), (2001), pp. 421–441; 
Qiang Xiao, ‘The Internet: a force to transform Chinese society?’, in Lionel M. Jensen and Timothy B. Weston, eds, 
China’s Transformation: The Stories Beyond the Headlines (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007), pp. 129–
143; Latham, Kevin. "New Media and Subjectivity in China: Problematizing the Public Sphere." In Towards a New 
Development Paradigm in Twenty-First Century China: Economy, Society and Politics, edited by Eric Florence and 
Pierre Defraigne, 203-17. London and New York Routledge, 2013. 
9 King, Gary, Jennifer Pan, and Margaret E. Roberts. "How Censorship in China Allows Government Criticism but 
Silences Collective Expression." American Political Science Review 107, no. 2 (2013): 326-43; MacKinnon, 
Rebecca. "Flatter World and Thicker Walls? Blogs, Censorship and Civic Discourse in China." Public Choices 134, 
no. 1-2 (2008): 31-46. 
10 Tong, Yanqi, and Shaohua Lei. "War of Position and Microblogging in China." Journal of Contemporary China 
22, no. 80 (2013): 292-311. 
11 Zheng, Technological Empowerment; Kalathil and Boas, Open Networks, Closed Regimes; Tamara Renee Shie, 
‘The tangled web: does the Internet offer promise or peril for the Chinese Communist Party?’, Journal of 
Contemporary China 13(40), (2004), pp. 523–540.  
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notably, this was arguably done with a good measure of effectiveness. Examining this 
case thus provides us an opportunity to move beyond the control-resistance 
dichotomous narrative that dominates research on internet in China to-date. 
Furthermore, it showcases a different kind of politics of the internet in which the state 
assumes a more proactive role in the “battlefield” of ideology and propaganda.12  
In the rest of this paper, we first explain our theoretical perspective based on the 
Gramscian notion of hegemony and Laclacu and Mouffe’s post-Marxist development 
of hegemony theory in relation to discourse. This is followed by a discussion of the 
internet and propaganda in China. Subsequently, we examine the “positive energy” 
discourses empirically, offering first an account of the term’s origins and its multiple 
and evolving connotations; and then a structured analysis which distinguishes three 
levels on which “positive energy” currently operates in trending Chinese discourses. In 
the discussion section, we address how this “positive energy” discursive 
hegemonization is achieved, in conjunction with some observations on the 
developments in media and internet control since China entered the Xi era. Finally, we 
briefly conclude.  
 
Discourse and hegemony: “nodal point” and “chain of equivalence”  
Theorizing the basic Marxist tenet of class antagonism, Antonio Gramsci proposed the 
influential concept of hegemony, defined as domination by ideological, intellectual and 
moral leadership, based on the consent of the subordinate groups.13 This represented a 
departure from a materialist-determinist view in which class subordination is achieved 
purely through coercion, and recognizes the role played by the superstructure, i.e. the 
realm of ideas, culture and symbols, in manufacturing consent. As Strinati elaborates, 
hegemony is the practice whereby  
 
dominant groups in society, including fundamentally but not exclusively the ruling class, 
maintain their dominance by securing the ‘spontaneous consent’ of subordinate groups, 
including the working class, through the negotiated construction of a political and ideological 
consensus which incorporates both dominant and dominated groups.14 
 
Such a consensus, however, cannot be taken for granted, but must be fought over, and 
maintained. For Gramsci then, class struggle involves the struggle for hegemony—for 
the subordinate class’s consent under a particular sociopolitical order.  
Based on Gramsci’s ideas above, and influenced by post-structuralist thinking 
emphasizing the indeterminacy of sign/signification, Laclau and Mouffe famously 
developed a social theory of hegemony centered on discourse.15 For Gramsci, class or 
social groups are pre-given because their interests are determined according to the 
economic structure. Laclau and Mouffe reject such materialist determinism and argue 
                                                        
12 Brady, Anne-Marie, and Juntao Wang. "China's Strengthened New Order and the Role of Propaganda." Journal 
of Contemporary China 18, no. 62 (2009): 767-88. 
13 Gramsci, Antonio. A Gramsci Reader: Selected Writings.  London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1971. 
14 Strinati, Dominic. An Introduction to Theories of Popular Culture.  London: Routledge, 1995, p.165.  
15 Laclau, Ernesto, and Chantal Mouffe. Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics. 
London: Verso, 2001. 
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that all social groupings are constituted by discourse and their meanings are never fixed 
but always open to reconstitution. In describing how hegemony can be achieved and 
subverted through discourse, Laclau and Mouffe developed a number of conceptual 
tools.  
A discourse is understood by Laclau and Mouffe as the attempted fixation of a 
web of meanings within a particular domain of signs.16 Signs are regarded as free-
floating, with a multiplicity of possible meanings. Before their meanings are fixed, 
signs are called elements; when their meanings are fixed, they become moments. 
“Discourses fix webs of meaning in relation to nodal points”,17 nodal points being key 
terms that secure signs in a specific constellation, turning them from elements into 
moments. For example, the term “Socialism” is a nodal point, and elements such as 
“democracy” or “rule of law” coalesce around it to become “Socialist democracy” and 
“Socialist rule of law” which can have very different meanings from the manners in 
which “democracy” and “rule of law” are understood in liberal capitalism. The practice 
that establishes relations between elements and stabilizes their meanings in relation to 
each other is articulation. A discourse is the result of articulation. In short, a discourse 
establishes a tentative closure, temporarily halting the fluctuations in the meaning of 
signs.  
Laclau and Mouffe stress, however, that this closure is never complete, because 
the meanings of signs are open to re-articulation. In the struggle for meaning fixation, 
discourses may come into conflict with each other, and one articulation may confront 
competing articulatory practices. In this antagonistic confrontation, hegemony emerges 
when one articulatory practice rises to dominance. As Laclau and Mouffe put it, “[i]n 
order to have hegemony, the requirement is that elements whose own nature does not 
predetermine them to enter into one type of arrangement rather than another, 
nevertheless coalesce, as a result of an external or articulating practice.”18 Therefore, 
hegemony involves the achievement of meaning fixation across discourses that collide 
antagonistically; and those attempts to establish hegemony may be called hegemonic 
interventions.  
Just as a discourse cannot crystallize elements into moments permanently, 
hegemony can be dissolved. In establishing and subverting hegemony, the logic of 
equivalence and logic of difference are at work. For instance, when the discourse of 
Revolution becomes hegemonic, although the revolutionaries hail from different social 
groups and backgrounds (e.g. farmers, workers, and small business owners), the 
revolutionary articulation dissolves their differences and render their positions 
equivalent, united in opposition to the anti-revolutionary. This logic of equivalence, 
however, can never completely eradicate the inherent dissimilarities among these 
disparate groups, but is always faced with the risk of subversion by the logic of 
difference: another articulation may accentuate the differences within the revolutionary 
                                                        
16 See also Jorgensen, Marianne W., and Louise J. Phillips. Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method. London: 
Sage, 2002. 
17 Rear, David, and Alan Jones. "Discursive Struggle and Contested Signifiers in the Arenas of Education Policy 
and Work Skills in Japan." Critical Policy Studies 7, no. 4 (2013): 375-94, p.379; original emphases.  
18 Laclau, Ernesto, and Chantal Mouffe. Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics. 
London: Verso, 2001, p.xii. 
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coalition, make members perceive their diverging interests, and hence dissolve the 
revolutionary hegemony. 
 
Hegemony, propaganda, and internet/online media in China 
The above theoretical formulations on hegemony remain highly pertinent to China. As 
Xiaobo Su has shown, both in China’s Communist revolution and in the post-1949 
Socialist construction, the CCP and its leaders have placed extraordinary emphasis on 
political ideology in order to shape mass consciousness, for the ultimate purpose of 
establishing hegemonic rule.19 Indeed, insofar as the realm of ideology and thought is 
concerned, much of Maoist China could be regarded as a project of Socialist 
hegemonization, finally taken to tragic extremes in the Cultural Revolution. Like in 
many countries that followed Communist/Socialist ideologies, propaganda was 
intensively used by the Maoist state to produce mass consent and elicit mass enthusiasm 
for the Socialist enterprise.20  
Since the country entered the reform era, and the focus of the CCP shifted from 
class struggle to economic development, propaganda work is increasingly caught in an 
awkward situation as the market logic took roots and people’s thoughts liberalized. 
Although in reform-era China, the propaganda machine has reinvented itself and 
continues to be extensively deployed to serve the evolving needs of the CCP party-
state,21 there can be little doubt that its capacity to hegemonize social discourses, let 
alone people’s thoughts, has been significantly weakened. As a telling piece of evidence, 
some scholars note that one of the reasons why central CCP departments resort to 
publishing propaganda articles under personified pseudonyms is “in order to reduce the 
negative emotional response of the target audience”.22  
There are multiple reasons why the contemporary Chinese state’s capacity to 
achieve hegemony is greatly reduced, but of particular relevance in the context of this 
study is the advent of the internet. Rising from barely 9 million internet users at the 
beginning of 2000,23 by February 2015, there were said to be as many as 557 million 
mobile internet users, and a total of 649 million netizens in China.24 For vast numbers 
of Chinese citizens, particularly the relatively young and educated urbanites, the 
internet has become the preeminent communicative medium and a crucial dimension 
to their citizenship, socialization, and identity expression. 25  Furthermore, in 
                                                        
19 Su, Xiaobo. "Revolution and Reform: The Role of Ideology and Hegemony in Chinese Politics." Journal of 
Contemporary China 20, no. 69 (2011): 307-26. 
20 Brady, Anne-Marie, and Juntao Wang. "China's Strengthened New Order and the Role of Propaganda." Journal 
of Contemporary China 18, no. 62 (2009): 767-88. 
21 Ibid. 
22  Tsai, Wen-Hsuan, and Peng-Hsiang Kao. "Secret Codes of Political Propaganda: The Unknown System of 
Writing Teams." The China Quarterly 214 (2013): 394-410, p.407; the target audience here refers to grassroots CCP 
cadres. 
23  China Internet Network Information Center (CNNIC), The Statistical (Semiannual) Reports of Internet 
Development in China [Zhongguo hulian wangluo fazhan zhuangkuang tongji baogao], (September 2015), available 
at: http://www.cnnic.cn/hlwfzyj/hlwxzbg/hlwtjbg/201206/t20120612_26725.htm (accessed 9 September 2015). 
24  Millward, Steven. "China Now Has 557m Mobile Internet Users, Grand Total of 649m Netizens."  
https://www.techinasia.com/cnnic-china-577-million-mobile-web-users-and-649-internet-users-2014/. 
25 Liu, Fengshu. Urban Youth in China: Modernity, the Internet and the Self.  London and New York: Routledge 
2011; Latham, Kevin. "New Media and Subjectivity in China: Problematizing the Public Sphere." In Towards a New 
Development Paradigm in Twenty-First Century China: Economy, Society and Politics, edited by Eric Florence and 
Pierre Defraigne, 203-17. London and New York Routledge, 2013. 
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comparison to traditional media such as newspapers and the TV, which are still obliged 
to act as the mouthpiece (houshe 喉舌) of the party-state,26 the internet and new media 
constitute a more dynamic and complex space because of its commercial and 
technological characteristics. Therefore, it is crucial to examine the online space in our 
current investigation of discourse and hegemony in China. 
The Chinese online space is characterised by a paradoxical combination of, indeed 
tension between, tight government control and vibrant online activism.27 On the one 
hand, the state operates an elaborate internet control and censorship regime, with one 
of the most powerful and sophisticated filtering systems in the world, the Great Firewall, 
in place.28 Apart from surveillance technology, the authorities also employ strategies 
such as formal regulation, economic incentive, and punitive action, to prevent and crush 
any online activities that are deemed to threaten social and political stability.29 On the 
other hand, observers of the Chinese cyberspace have noted that the state censorship 
regime is sophisticated enough to tolerate some critical voices and dissenting views, so 
long as these provided a channel for venting frustration without causing troubles.30 
Thus, despite repression, the internet indeed opens up a space, albeit limited, for 
ordinary Chinese to raise their own voices and articulate dissenting discourses, such as 
criticisms of official corruption, and even to pursue online activisms that challenge 
government policies and social injustices.31  In a growing body of scholarship on 
China’s internet,32 some scholars pay attention to control and censorship mechanisms 
and practices, 33  while others have focused on activism. 34  Suffice it to say, this 
scholarship emphasizes antagonism and conflict in China’s cyberspace, and these 
online antagonism and conflict reflect the contradictions existing in real in Chinese 
society.  
What this confrontation/conflict-focused analytical approach neglects are 
alternative logics to politics of discourse and media. As discussed in the previous 
section, hegemony is the discursive dissolution of antagonism and the creation of 
                                                        
26  Latham, Kevin. "Nothing but the Truth: News Media, Power and Hegemony in South China." The China 
Quarterly 163 (2000): 633-54. 
27 Yang, Guobin. "Activists Beyond Virtual Borders: Internet-Mediated Networks and Informational Politics in 
China." First Monday Special Issue 7 (2006). 
28 "Open Net Initiative." (2012) https://opennet.net/research/profiles/china. 
29 Tsui, Lokman. "The Panopticon as the Antithesis of a Space of Freedom: Control and Regulation of the Internet 
in China." China Information 17, no. 2 (2003): 65-82. 
30 Herold, David K. "Development of a Civil Society Online? Internet Vigilantism and State Control in Chinese 
Cyberspace." Asia Journal of Global Studies 2, no. 1 (2008): 26-37; King, Gary, Jennifer Pan, and Margaret E. 
Roberts. "How Censorship in China Allows Government Criticism but Silences Collective Expression." American 
Political Science Review 107, no. 2 (2013): 326-43. 
31 Tang, Lijun, and Helen Sampson. "The Interaction between Mass Media and the Internet in Non-Democratic 
States: The Case of China." Media, Culture & Society 34, no. 4 (2012): 457-71; Yang, Guobin. The Power of the 
Internet in China: Citizen Activism Online. New York: Columbia University Press, 2009. 
32 See Herold, David K., and Gabriele de Seta. "Through the Looking Glass: Twenty Years of Chinese Internet 
Research." The Information Society 31, no. 1 (2015): 68-82 for a comprehensive review.  
33 E.g. King, Gary, Jennifer Pan, and Margaret E. Roberts. "How Censorship in China Allows Government Criticism 
but Silences Collective Expression." American Political Science Review 107, no. 2 (2013): 326-43; Li, Shubo. "The 
Online Public Space and Popular Ethos in China." Media, Culture & Society 32, no. 1 (2010): 63-83; MacKinnon, 
Rebecca. "Flatter World and Thicker Walls? Blogs, Censorship and Civic Discourse in China." Public Choices 134, 
no. 1-2 (2008): 31-46; Tsui, Lokman. "The Panopticon as the Antithesis of a Space of Freedom: Control and 
Regulation of the Internet in China." China Information 17, no. 2 (2003): 65-82. 
34  E.g. Hassid, Jonathan. "Safety Valve or Pressure Cooker? Blogs in Chinese Political Life." Journal of 
Communication 62, no. 2 (2012): 212-30; Yang (2009). 
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consent. In the struggle for discursive hegemony, the emphasis is on the rearticulation 
of the meaning of information rather than the simplistic suppression of information. 
The former is characteristic of hegemonic intervention, while the latter is characteristic 
of repressive control such as censorship. Despite some scholars’ efforts to highlight the 
importance of the former more sophisticated approach to “guiding” public 
opinion/discourse,35 scholarly attention to hegemonic intervention has been inadequate 
so far.  
To be sure, we are not the first to bring the theoretical perspective of discourse and 
hegemony to bear on the study of the Chinese cyber-/media-sphere. Several recently 
published studies on cyber activism in China have utilized similar conceptual 
frameworks, but they all focus on the counter-hegemonic articulatory practices of 
Chinese netizens or online opinion leaders, bringing into relief the CCP party-state’s 
inability to hold onto a discursive hegemony.36 Similarly, a number of other studies 
examined how Chinese netizens used mockery, satire and parody to playfully 
undermine CCP propaganda slogans and propagandist news programs, which may also 
be interpreted as a form of counter-hegemonic discursive struggle.37 These studies’ 
common focus on the counter-hegemonic is arguably another manifestation of the 
dominance of a control-vs.-resistance perspective as noted earlier, which leaves the 
party-state’s strategies and/or agency under-studied.  
In summary, our above literature review identifies three interrelated arguments or 
patterns in existing scholarship. First, post-Mao CCP party-state’s ability to establish 
hegemony is said to have been significantly weakened. Second, to-date, research on the 
internet in China has often assumed an antagonistic outlook, focusing on conflict but 
not consent. Thirdly, the CCP part-state tends to be portrayed as a passive actor relying 
largely on repressive measures to achieve control of the (online) media and social 
discourse. The case of “positive energy”, as we deal with in the rest of this paper, 
presents a case of state-initiated hegemonic intervention that arguably unsettles all three 
received wisdoms.  
 
A note on method and data 
The term “positive energy” attracted the attention of one of the authors when it was 
announced to be the top catchphrase of the year at the end of 2012. Since then, he has 
been collecting news reports related to this term while browsing Chinese news on the 
Internet on a daily basis. While these materials served as the starting point and the initial 
data for this paper, we subsequently performed searches in a more schematic manner 
                                                        
35 Lagerkvist, Johan. After the Internet, before Democracy: Competing Norms in Chinese Media and Society. Bern: 
Peter Lang, 2010. Stockmann, Daniela. "Who Believes Propaganda? Media Effects During the Anti-Japanese 
Protests in Beijing." The China Quarterly 202 (2010): 269–89. 
36 Gleiss, Marielle Stigum. "Speaking up for the Suffering (Br) Other: Weibo Activism, Discursive Struggles, and 
Minimal Politics in China." Media, Culture & Society 37, no. 4 (2015): 513-29; Yang, Guobin. "Contesting Food 
Safety in the Chinese Media: Between Hegemony and Counter- Hegemony." The China Quarterly 214 (2013): 337-
55; Tong, Yanqi, and Shaohua Lei. "War of Position and Microblogging in China." Journal of Contemporary China 
22, no. 80 (2013): 292-311. 
37 Tang, Lijun, and Peidong Yang. "Symbolic Power and the Internet: The Power of a 'Horse'." Media, Culture & 
Society 33, no. 5 (2011): 675-91; Tang, Lijun. "The Politics of Flies: Mocking News in Chinese Cyberspace." 
Chinese Journal of Communication 6, no. 4 (2013): 482-96; Esarey, Ashley, and Xiao Qiang. "Political Expression 
in the Chinese Blogosphere: Below the Radar." Asian Survey 48, no. 5 (2008): 752-72. 
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on both CNKI.net (China National Knowledge Infrastructure) and Baidu.com in order 
to trace the origins and development of the term.  
    CNKI.net is China’s integrated national online database system providing the most 
comprehensive data services on academic and professional publications. CNKI’s 
“Important Chinese Newspapers Full-text Database” covers 154 national titles and 450 
provincial/local titles, in other words, virtually all of China’s more influential print 
newspapers. Using this database, we were able to gather statistics on the appearances 
of “positive energy” in mainstream state-controlled media discourse, as all print 
newspapers in China are subject to strict state censorship. Baidu is the top Chinese 
searching engine, and Baidu News enabled us to search for news reports containing the 
term “positive energy” published after 2003. As a China-based search engine, Baidu 
search is inevitably subject to filtering. However, in the present case about “positive 
energy”, we believe filtering or censorship has had minimal impact on our research 
results. This is because, as our argument goes, the Chinese state in fact actively 
promoted the term’s popularization instead of suppressing it.  
Finally, we also consulted online encyclopedias, such as Wikipedia, Baidu-pedia, 




The “positive energy” evolution and explosion: from science, superstition, and 
charity, to positive psychology and propaganda 
As discussed earlier, hegemony involves articulating and fixing meanings in relation to 
nodal points. Therefore, to address the question how the term “positive energy” became 
a vehicle for hegemonic intervention, it is crucial to trace the origins and development 
of the term and discern the various meanings attached to it.  
“Positive energy” became a popular catchphrase in 2012, but its media presence 
dates back earlier. Figure 1 below is created based on CNKI database. It shows, prior 
to 2007, the appearances of “positive energy” in Chinese newspapers were negligible; 
between 2007 and 2011, the term started to gain some foothold, but remained far and 
few in between; then, 2012 suddenly saw the term gain massive traction, to be followed 
by steadily high levels of visibility from 2013 up to the present, although the 
phenomenon is arguably showing signs of tailing off most recently. This pattern was 
corroborated by our searches on the internet using Baidu search engine too.  
 
(Figure 1. “Positive energy” in major Chinese newspapers since 2000) [see end of 
the manuscript] 
 
Pre-2012 usages: origins, meanings, development 
Our investigations show that, prior to 2012, there were broadly four meanings or 
ways in which the term “positive energy” had been used: (1) as a layman’s 
appropriation of a supposedly scientific jargon; (2) as a concept associated with Chinese 
superstitions; (3) as a way to refer to acts of charity/philanthropy; and (4) as a notion 
spoken in the context of personal emotional or psychological matters.  
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In the first case, “positive energy” was apparently a jargon from theoretical physics 
and cosmic science,38 which then found its way into more earthly matters such as stock 
trading. The earliest mention of “positive energy” on Chinese cyberspace we found was 
in a 2003 article that advertised a stock trading software.39 In explaining one of the 
modeling functions in the software, the article claims that the model “…applies the 
concept of energy in physics and cosmic science to the stock market”, and that “positive 
energy indicates that the market is on a rising tide, while negative energy indicates that 
the market is on a retreating tide”. 
As an interesting juxtaposition to this purportedly scientific provenance of the 
term, “positive energy” also appeared in relation to Chinese superstitions. In a 2007 
article which was first carried by a Guangzhou-based commercial daily and 
subsequently reposted on 163.com, a geomancy expert talked about lighting 
arrangements in the domestic setting as follows:40 “Home […] is a place to accumulate 
and recharge energy. […] lighting is an important source of energy in the home setting; 
different shapes, colors and numbers of lights brings different kinds of energy. 
Therefore, we have to learn about those correct lighting arrangements that bring 
positive energy, and bring the family good fortune”.41 
The third usage of “positive energy” was to refer to acts of charity or the positive 
effects charitable acts bring about in the society. This was witnessed, for example, in 
the name of a youth volunteer group founded in Hong Kong in 2004 there: “Green 
Apple Positive Energy Youth Team”, for which the Hong Kong superstar Andy Lau 
acted as the patron.42 And finally, the fourth pre-2012 meaning in which the term 
“positive energy” had been circulating online was to do with personal emotional and 
psychological matters. Often spoken in opposition to “negative energy” (fu nengliang 
负能量 ), which refers to the negative emotions or attitudes following trials and 
tribulations in personal life, “positive energy” means optimism, positive attitudes and 
emotions that help individuals overcome these difficulties or hardships. It is noteworthy 
that all the earliest references to “positive energy” in the above two meanings on the 
Chinese internet were in fact found in entertainment news stories about Hong Kong 
celebrities.43 Thus, we believe that Hong Kong might have been the place of origin for 
these two particular usages of the term, and Hong Kong-based celebrities inadvertently 
played an important albeit indirect role in popularizing this term in the Chinese 
mainland through entertainment news reporting focused on them.  
 
2012: popularization 
2012 marked the beginning of the massive popularization of the term, to which 
two events made immediate and significant contribution.  
                                                        
38 See a Baidu post in 2006 involving a question-and-answer about the cosmic phenomenon of ‘worm hole’ which 
mentioned ‘positive/negative energy’: http://zhidao.baidu.com/new?word%&ie%GBK (accessed 25 July 2015). 
39 http://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/20030808/1846399224.shtml (accessed 25 July 2015). 
40  Chinese geomancy, or fengshui, is a system of knowledge drawing on traditional Chinese cosmology, 
metaphysics and supernatural beliefs that studies the location-ing/positioning of objects and ‘elements’ and its 
consequences for the fortunes of people and/or places.  
41 http://news.163.com/07/1107/09/3SMH6A2E000120GU.html (accessed 25 July 2015). 
42 http://news.sina.com.cn/o/2004-06-27/19052922284s.shtml (accessed 25 July 2015). 
43 http://ent.qq.com/music/a/20050625/000010_1.htm (accessed 25 July 2015); http://ent.sina.com.cn/s/h/2007-
12-03/09521817124.shtml (accessed 25 July 2015). 
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The first event was the 2012 London Olympics. Among the eighteen Chinese who 
were invited to take part in that year’s Olympics torch relay,44 eight particularly stood 
out in the eyes of the Chinese public. Instead of being elite public figures, these eight 
were “grassroots” (caogen) Chinese citizens who distinguished themselves by 
embodying social conscience, civic spirit, and morally laudable conducts. For example, 
among them was a Xinjiang Uyghur man who earned a modest living by selling 
barbequed lamb but nevertheless donated the lion’s share of his earnings to support the 
schooling of hundreds of poor Chinese children. Similarly, the other seven Chinese 
torch runners were all recognized nationwide for their morally exemplary conduct 
and/or public contributions in fields such as education, environmental protectionism, 
and charity—in other words, for their “positive energy”.  
Effusively praising these outstanding compatriots, many touched Chinese social 
media users at the time posted microblogs (for example, on Sina and Sohu Weibo) with 
“positive energy” in the headlines.45 Soon, the Chinese internet and social media 
sphere were flooded with “positive energy”-tagged posts and stories, some related to 
the torch runners, others pertaining to “positive energy” stories in people’s daily lives 
similar to those of the torch runners. Such phenomenal trending of “positive energy” 
on social media indicated that the Chinese public was moved by what the eight Olympic 
torch runners stood for, and was inspired to generate and spread “positive energy” in 
emulation. As one online blog article observed effusively:  
 
These torch runners, who are representatives of Chinese positive energy, use their own actions 
to illustrate the positive energy of the Chinese grassroots, and make more Chinese people 
understand the meaning of positive energy. China needs more positive energy, more brave and 
kind-hearted people; the positive energy contained in their bodies will give the society a little 
bit more warmth, and a little less indifference, a little bit more helpfulness, and a little less 
guardedness. Positive energy makes people more trusting, and less deceitful; it makes people 
love China and this world a bit more. Thousands upon thousands of netizens call for positive 
energy on their Weibo, this shows how much they desire truth, benevolence, and beauty; how 
much they aspire to the values of equality, justice, and harmony.46 
 
A second event accounting for the popularization of “positive energy” in 2012 was 
the translation and publication of British positive psychology guru Richard Wiseman’s 
book Rip It Up in China as Positive Energy 正能量. As a book that claims to offer a 
new approach towards achieving positive attitudes leading to greater happiness and 
success in life, Wiseman’s book is a positive psychology self-help manual that employs 
the term “positive energy” in the fourth meaning as we examined previously. However, 
in comparing the book’s original version in English and its Chinese translation, we 
discovered that the former contained no mention of the expression “positive energy” at 
all, and it became clear that “positive energy” was entirely a Chinese imposition during 
the translation process.47 Hence, the popularity of Wiseman’s positive psychology and 
                                                        
44 http://www.china.com.cn/sports/txt/2012-07/11/content_25879298.htm (accessed 26 July 2015). 
45 http://blog.cntv.cn/18950958-3961614.html (accessed 27 July 2015). 
46 http://blog.cntv.cn/18950958-3961614.html (accessed 27 July 2015). 
47  Similarly, we found that although a book entitled Communication of Positive Energy 沟 通 正 能量
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the trending status of the expression “positive energy” in its own right could be said to 
have had a mutually enhancing effect, propelling the term into greater popularity.  
 
Since 2012: official appropriation and promotion 
One observant Chinese commentator pointed out a curious fact about Rip It 
Up/Positive Energy in an online essay: while Rip It Up was first published on 5 July 
2012 in English by the publisher Macmillan, the Chinese version Positive Energy came 
out as soon as on 1 August 2012, with less than a month in between.48 Remarking 
“anybody with a little knowledge about the [book] publication cycle should be able to 
smell something fishy”, this commentator hinted at a conspiracy theory whereby the 
Chinese government possibly had a hand in promoting the catchphrase.49  
Regardless of this conspiracy theory, it was clear that from 2012 the regime indeed 
demonstrated a measure of fondness towards “positive energy”, as the term began to 
make increasingly frequent appearances in communications and/or publications 
associated with the party-state. On 7 April 2012, an article with the headline “Transmit 
Positive Energy wherever you can” appeared in China Youth Daily, the organ of the 
Communist Youth League of China, encouraging people to create a harmonious society 
through kindhearted deeds and moral behaviors.50 An article dated 4 September 2012 
appeared in Beijing Business Today, under the title “State Administration of Radio Film 
& Television: We Encourage the Making of TV Dramas with Positive Energy”.51 
The most remarkable official appropriation and endorsement of “positive energy” 
in 2012, however, came from none other than Xi Jinping himself. In December, Xi, who 
had become China’s top leader a month before, received former US President Jimmy 
Carter in Beijing, to whom he remarked—“Both China and the United States should be 
innovative and make efforts to accumulate ‘positive energy’ to build a China-U.S. 
cooperative partnership based on mutual respect and mutual benefit.”52 Barely a week 
later, when Wang Qishan, Member of the Standing Committee of the CCP Politburo, 
visited the United States, he followed Xi in also using “positive energy” in his 
speeches.53  
Since 2013, “positive energy” has been in full bloom in various forms of Chinese 
media, and secured a place in the party-state rhetoric at the highest level. For instance, 
as we quoted at the beginning of this paper, Qiushi, the organ of the CCP Central 
Committee, carried an article on 16 June 2013 under the title “Beware of Negative 
Energy on the Internet”.54 Denouncing “negative energy” in the form of negative news 
and other critical online content that make people disillusioned or cynical towards the 
                                                        
(http://product.dangdang.com/23519105.html) came out in China in 2014 as the Chinese translation of the works of 
American self-improvement guru Dale Carnegie, the latter never used the term “positive energy” in the title of any 
of his original books in English. 
48 http://www.21ccom.net/articles/thought/bianyan/20150309121954_all.html (accessed 27 July 2015).  
49 The one example we found indicating the CCP’s direct endorsement of Rip It Up was an article in the 5 November 
2013’s Xinhua Daily (CCP’s oldest national newspaper dating back to before the PRC’s founding) under the ‘CPC 
News – Theory’ section. See http://theory.people.com.cn/n/2013/1105/c40531-23441342.html (accessed 28 July 
2015). 
50 http://zqb.cyol.com/html/2012-04/07/nw.D110000zgqnb_20120407_4-03.htm (accessed 27 July 2015). 
51 http://tech.sina.com.cn/i/2012-09-04/01207578481.shtml (accessed 27 July 2015). 
52 http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-12/13/c_132039163.htm (accessed 27 July 2015). 
53 http://www.voachinese.com/content/xi-jinping-wang-qishan-20121220/1568796.html (accessed 27 July 2015). 
54 http://www.qstheory.cn/zxdk/2013/201312/201306/t20130613_239399.htm (accessed 23 July 2015). 
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Party and government, the article advocates boycotting “negative energy” and 
encourages netizens to become transmitters of “positive energy” to create hopefulness 
and uplifting attitudes. Espousing essentially the same logic, an editorial piece in the 9 
July 2013’s People’s Daily appeared under the headline “Use the new media well, to 
promote positive energy.”55 
In addition to the governing of cyberspace, the term “positive energy” has also 
been used in the broader contexts of propaganda work, education, and even strategic 
relations and international affairs. For instance, in October 2014, Xi Jinping presided 
over an important Forum on Literature and Arts in Beijing, one that was reminiscent of 
the landmark 1942 Yan’an Forum on Literature and Arts at which Mao Zedong cast the 
role of creative work under Chinese socialism as one of serving politics. At the end of 
this 2014 Forum, Xi made a point to greet two popular but controversial young bloggers 
who were known for their stridently patriotic and nationalistic writings, saying to them 
“I hope you will create more works with positive energy.”56 A Quishi article published 
on 3 February 2015 says sternly, “Teachers must spread positive energy in the 
classroom”.57 During the 13th Shangri-La Forum taking place in Singapore May-June 
2014, the People’s Liberation Army Deputy Chief-of-Staff Wang Guanzhong reassured 
the Forum that “For Asia’s peace and security, China represents a constructive force, a 
positive force, a positive energy”.58  
 
Defining “positive energy” and mapping its meanings 
Having traced the trajectory of “positive energy” on China’s online media, we are in a 
position to advance the following definition of the term as it is currently used:  
 
positive energy is the capacity to induce positive emotions and/or attitudes, the potential to 
induce constructive/conciliatory discourses and/or actions, in individuals or collectives of 
individuals such as the society and nation. Those positive emotions/attitudes/thoughts so 
induced are also simply referred to as positive energy, as is any event/discourse that is said to 
contain positive energy.  
 
    Furthermore, by tracing its trajectory we identify three distinct yet interrelated 
levels on which “positive energy” is meaningful.  
 
Individual-Personal  
First, “positive energy” is spoken of at the individual-personal level. This includes 
both the meaning popularized by Hong Kong celebrities facing personal trials and 
tribulations and the positive psychology sense of the term. The characteristics of 
“positive energy” discourses at this level are that they tend to be inward-looking, 
introspective, reflective, often underpinned by an individualistic ethos. 
The literary form in which “positive energy” of this hue is typically carried is 
commonly known in Chinese sociolinguistic contexts as “chicken soup” (jitang 鸡汤). 
                                                        
55 http://opinion.people.com.cn/n/2013/0709/c1003-22128956.html (accessed 28 July 2015). 
56 http://news.china.com/domestic/945/20141016/18863497_all.html (accessed 28 July 2015). 
57 http://www.qstheory.cn/wp/2015-02/03/c_1114240287.htm (accessed 28 July 2015). 
58 http://www.chinanews.com/mil/2014/06-01/6235104.shtml (accessed 28 July 2015). 
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With origins in the title of motivational speakers Jack Canfield and Mark Victor 
Hansen’s book series Chicken Soup for the Soul, the term “chicken soup” now widely 
refers to any textual (or visual) form that conveys motivational aphorisms or messages 
of wisdom in China. One good example of this is the popular mobile phone chat 
application WeChat’s subscription function of Chinese Readers’ Digest Selections. The 
latter regularly updates the subscribers with nicely written mini essays, often 
accompanied by beautiful illustrations, that ruminate on topics such as how to lead a 
better life or how to be a better person. The slogan of this Readers’ Digest is “Share big 
wisdom; spread positive energy” 分享大智慧 传播正能量. 
 
Societal-Cultural 
The second level is the societal-cultural. “Positive energy” on this level 
encompasses all the examples we examined previously relating to acts of charity, 
exemplary moral conduct, social conscience, civic virtues, and so forth. We call this 
category societal-cultural because “positive energy” discourses on this level pertain 
primarily to social interactions/relations, are almost always about moral/ethical issues 
arising from society, and are essentially underpinned by human value systems, be they 
universal or culturally specific. This category of “positive energy” discourses, we 
estimate, accounts for the majority of internet and social media contents tagged with 
this label. And we believe that this is because “positive energy” in this connotation 
enjoys the greatest resonance with Chinese users of the internet and social media.  
The typical discursive form in which societal-cultural “positive energy” manifests 
is journalism, including both institutionalized/ journalism and citizen journalism 
enabled through the ubiquitous access to mobile internet and social media. The Chinese 
term haoren haoshi 好人好事, literally meaning “good people good deeds”, perhaps 
most succinctly describes this genre of journalism. In April 2015, ifeng.com, possibly 
the most dynamic and progressive of China’s large media companies, created a section 
called “warm story” 暖新闻 dedicated to news stories that supposedly warm people’s 
hearts with “positive energy”.59 Most of these “warm stories” are big or small “good 
people good deeds” narratives. Apparently, ifeng.com set a national trend: by now, 
many influential national internet portals such as sohu.com, 163.com, Xinhua News, 
and numerous provincial/local portals, feature “warm story” sections. In all cases, the 
explicit mission of these sections is to “pass on positive energy” 传递正能量. No doubt, 
the promotion of such “positive energy” news by the media falls neatly in line with the 
party-state’s policy.  
 
Political-National/Global 
The third and grandest level of discourse at which “positive energy” has been 
operating is what we venture to call the political-national/global, because discourses 
of this kind are characterized by the explicit ways in which they pertain to 
political/ideological/strategic issues at domestic and/or international/global levels. The 
positive values affirmed and propagated include, most prominently, nationalism, 
patriotism, and “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics”. At the 18th CCP Party 
                                                        
59 http://news.ifeng.com/listpage/70374/1/list.shtml (accessed 29 July 2015). 
 15 
Congress of 2012 which saw the transition of power to the Xi Jinping leadership, the 
notion of Core Socialist Values 社会主义核心价值观 was raised to encompass most, if 
not all, of such politically and ideologically-oriented “positive” values.60  
Political-national/global “positive energy” can be found in a variety of textual 
forms. In addition to the obvious domain of state-controlled mass communication, 
another important source is elite or learned discourses such as scholarly publications or 
expert commentaries on political issues and current affairs. For example, party-state 
education/research organs such as the CCP Central Party School and think tanks serving 
the party-state such as the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences61 and the Central 
Compilation and Translation Bureau, 62  routinely publish theoretical works that 
explicate and justify the current Chinese political system. Such works are said to have 
“positive energy” because they provide legitimacy for, and therefore hope and 
confidence in the “China model”. Indeed, also raised at the 18th Party Congress was 
the slogan of “Three Self-Confidence” 三个自信, namely, confidence in the (Socialist) 
road, confidence in the theory (of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics), and 
confidence in the (Chinese Socialist) institutions.  
Internationally/globally-oriented use of “positive energy” includes discourses 
about China’s peaceful rise, China’s positive contributions to regional/global order and 
security, and China’s establishment of win-win relationships with other world countries. 
It is worth pointing out that, in such political “positive energy” discourses, the national 
orientation and international/global orientation are often closely connected. “Positive 
energy” in relation to China’s domestic political system or governance is often a 
response to Western liberal-democratic critiques (which are obviously regarded as a 
kind of “negative energy”); and assertions about China’s constructive role in the global 
order further justifies China’s domestic sociopolitical order.63 The “positive energy” 
transmitted by pro-regime public intellectuals such as Zhang Weiwei and Martin 
Jacques illustrates this point well.  
 
 
[Table 1. Current “positive energy” in Chinese mediasphere - a three-level 
analysis] (see end of the manuscript) 
 
    Although we separate “positive energy” into three categories in the above analysis, 
these categories are not mutually exclusive. For example, although Core Socialist 
Values primarily underpin political-ideological “positive energy”, some of the Core 
Values are evidently also celebrated in societal-cultural “positive energy” discourses.64 
Furthermore, “positive energy” often permeates the boundaries, and the recipient or 
                                                        
60 Core Socialist Values include: prosperity, democracy, civility, harmony, freedom, equality, justice, the rule of 
law, patriotism, dedication, integrity and friendship. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-
02/25/c_126190257.htm (accessed 30 July 2015).  
61 Margaret Sleeboom-Faulkner, The Chinese Academy of Social Sciences: Shaping the Reforms, Academia and 
China (1977–2003) (Leiden: Brill, 2007) 
62 Ngeow, Chow Bing. "From Translation House to Think Tank: The Changing Role of the Chinese Communist 
Party's Central Compilation and Translation Bureau." Journal of Contemporary China 24, no. 93 (2014): 554-72. 
63 See also Edney, Kingsley. "Soft Power and the Chinese Propaganda System." Journal of Contemporary China 
21, no. 78 (2012): 899-914. 
64 See note 71. 
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transmitter of “positive energy” can mobilize different types simultaneously and across 
boundaries. For instance, an individual person afflicted with “negative energy” may try 
to gain “positive energy” not only by practicing an introspective self-
examination/improvement (i.e. individual-personal), but also by becoming more 
optimistic and hopeful about the society/culture (i.e. societal-cultural) and the nation-
state and global world (i.e. political-national/global) in which they live. In fact, such 
boundary/category-crossing lies at the heart of the relative effectiveness of the “positive 
energy” discursive intervention, as we turn to discuss next. 
 
Discussion 
Deng Xiaoping’s reform saw China transition from a(n) (eventually failed) 
revolutionary hegemony to a(n) (initially successful) reformist hegemony.65 But as 
reform deepened and social stratification intensified,66 post-Deng CCP leaderships 
were faced with the increasingly challenging task of producing mass consent amidst 
mounting social antagonisms. Both Xi’s predecessors, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, 
propagated their own brands of hegemonic theoretical systems, respectively under the 
labels of “Three Represents” Theory 三个代表重要思想 and “Harmonious Society” 
和谐社会.67 The former advocated, at its core, that the CCP represented the most 
fundamental interest of the greatest masses, whereas the latter envisioned a society in 
which all interests are in harmony under the leadership of the Party.  
Yet, both catchphrases encountered significant discursive counter-hegemonic 
resistance in the Chinese cyberspace. With “Three Represents” homophonically 
ridiculed by netizens as “wearing three watches” (戴三个表 ), 68  and similarly 
“Harmonious Society” as “river crab” (河蟹),69 these two expressions spawned a large 
amount of online satiric texutal production. As attempts to create mass consent and 
discursive hegemony, thus, both were evidently failures. In contrast, in the recent case 
of “positive energy”, we find little evidence of a widespread popular resistance, save 
for a handful of articles written by intellectuals critiquing the notion.70 In fact, by and 
large “positive energy” appears to continue to enjoy considerable grassroots popularity 
despite appropriation by the regime. By early August 2015, for instance, as many as 
816,705 Sina Weibo users had the words “positive energy” explicitly in their IDs. As a 
hegemonic intervention into public discourse, “positive energy” seems to have been 
remarkably more effective than previous slogans of hegemonic intent. Why has this 
been the case?  
                                                        
65 Deng famously said: ‘Development is the absolute principle’ (fazhan caishi ying daoli); See also Su, Xiaobo. 
“Revolution and Reform: The Role of Ideology and Hegemony in Chinese Politics.” Journal of Contemporary China 
20, no. 69 (2011): 307-26. 
66 Wang, Hui. The End of the Revolution: China and the Limits of Modernity. London: Verso, 2011. 
67 Holbig, Heike. "Remaking the Ccp's Ideology: Determinants, Progress, and Limits under Hu Jintao." Journal of 
Current Chinese Affairs 38, no. 3 (2009): 35-61. 
68 Esarey, Ashley, and Xiao Qiang. "Political Expression in the Chinese Blogosphere: Below the Radar." Asian 
Survey 48, no. 5 (2008): 752-72. 
69 Tang, Lijun, and Peidong Yang. "Symbolic Power and the Internet: The Power of a 'Horse'." Media, Culture & 
Society 33, no. 5 (2011): 675-91; Nordin, Astrid, and Lisa Richaud. "Subverting Official Language and Discourse 
in China? Type River Crab for Harmony." China Information 28, no. 1 (2014): 47-67. 
70 E.g.: http://bbs.tianya.cn/post-free-3191567-1.shtml;  
http://www.thinkread.cn/comment/8259/; 
http://www.21ccom.net/articles/thought/bianyan/20150309121954_all.html (accessed 30 July 2015). 
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What distinguishes “positive energy” from contrived theoretical constructs such 
as “Three Represents” and “Harmonious Society” is, most notably, the former’s non-
official origins in popular online discourse. This difference is significant. First, as 
existing discourse, the general public has already attached certain meanings to “positive 
energy”. Furthermore, these meanings are not explicitly defined in text as we do in this 
paper, but are articulated through action, that is, making and spreading “positive energy” 
posts online. Thus, from the beginning, “positive energy” entails, as well as points to 
certain directions for, grassroots participation. Second, the initial popularty of “positive 
energy” seems to reflect basic intuitions and psychological needs of humans as social 
beings. People desire to be happy individuals, leading socially and culturally fulfilling 
lives. Arguably, this means they are naturally inclined towards individual-personal and 
societal-cultural “positive energies”. In other words, “positive energy” is rooted in and 
springs out of basic human feelings. By contrast, both “Three Represents” and 
“Harmonious Society” were contructed anew from the top as socialist theories. With 
the sole aim to justify the legitimacy of the party regime71, their meanings were spelled 
out by party theorists and exisited only at the ideological level. They had no connection 
with and could not be translated into any grassroots action. Furthermore, the top down 
approach means that they were not springing out of public sentiments. Maybe they were 
intended to appeal to public feelings (especially considering “Harmounious Society” 
draws upon Confucius philosophy), but top down appealing is no guarantee of success. 
Instead, the ideological purpose appears to alienate the people, resulting in the terms 
being widely ridiculed. 
As the meanings of “positive energy” are not fixed but articulated in action, it 
leaves room for further expansion. Thus, through it, the authorities take the opportunity 
to articulate a political-national/global “positive energy”, which is more directly in the 
service of political stability such as patriotism and nationalism. Equally, patriotism and 
nationalism can evoke positive feelings and attitudes among many ordinary Chinese 
people, as a result of long-term, deep-rooted political socialization (especially through 
education). In fact, the Internet use in China has seen by many to have promoted 
patriotism and nationalism72.  
The intervention of the authorities, however, should not be seen simply as adding 
an extra layer of meaning to it. Rather, it entails appropriating the expression and using 
it as a “nodal point” to create “chains of equivalence”, to invoke the theoretical 
vocabulary of Laclau and Mouffe’s as expounded earlier. In other words, as a “nodal 
point”, “positive energy” links together elements otherwise scattered at different levels 
or domains, and accentuate their common significance as being “positive”. This 
operation renders previously unrelated elements, such as optimism/confidence 
(personal-level), charity/philanthropy (societal-level), and patriotism/nationalism 
(political-level), equivalent to each other in the sense that they are all “positive”, thus 
dissolving or reducing the differences between the three levels. The boundaries between, 
                                                        
71 Holbig, Heike. "Remaking the Ccp's Ideology: Determinants, Progress, and Limits under Hu Jintao." Journal of 
Current Chinese Affairs 38, no. 3 (2009): 35-61. 
72 E.g. MacKinnon, Rebecca. "Flatter world and thicker walls? Blogs, censorship and civic discourse in 
China." Public Choice 134, no. 1-2 (2008): 31-46; Ma, Yiben. "Online Chinese nationalism and its nationalist 
discourses."Routledge Handbook of Chinese Media (2015): 203. 
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say, confidence in the self and faith in the regime can thus be blurred or confused, 
resulting in a melting down of the antagonism that may otherwise exist between 
individual members of the public and the regime.  
The articulation and propagation of “positive energy” necessarily create the 
category of “negative energy”. “Negativities” such as negative feelings on a personal 
or individual level, discursive elements that refer to the dark side of the Chinese 
society/culture, and any discourse that criticizes the political system or the party-state, 
are all labeled “negative energy”, seen as being bad, and boycotted. The logic of 
equivalence works here too to create a conflation between negative feelings at the 
individual-personal level, which positive psychology instructs people to avoid at all 
cost, and critical feelings regarding societal-cultural and national-political issues. In 
other words, when a chain of equivalence is established through the nodal point of 
“negative energy”, a likely outcome is that people are pressurized into avoiding critical 
or negative feelings about societal and political matters, as such sentiments are 
stigmatized as “negative energy”, something to avoid just like negativities on the 
individual-personal level. A possible outcome of this equivalence is then an 
unconditionally non-critical sociopolitical subject in the name of avoiding “negative 
energy”. 
The successful establishment of such chains of equivalence relies firstly on basic 
psychological needs of humans for positive feelings as we mentioned earlier. In 
addition, we speculate that one further source of legitimacy for the term lies in the 
cultural-ideological connotations associated with the Chinese character for “positive”, 
i.e. zheng 正. With zheng also meaning righteousness, uprightness and incorruptibility, 
this character appears in many traditional Chinese idioms and sayings (such as haoran 
zhengqi浩然正气; buzheng zhifeng 不正之风; zhengren junzi 正人君子) which have 
been re-emphasized in Xi Jinping’s ongoing anti-corruption campaign—a campaign 
that has garnered considerable popular approval and support. Not implausibly, this 
linguistically-rooted cultural ideology surrounding positivity/zheng further contributes 
towards the Chinese public’s identification with zheng nengliang.  
Although we highlight the relative effectiveness of the official appropriation and 
promotion of “positive energy” discourses as a case of hegemonic intervention, we do 
not wish to exaggerate it, for at least two reasons, one empirical and one theoretical. 
Empirically, it should be acknowledged, as the term became increasingly associated 
with official propaganda, more and more netizens may start to find it alienating. 
Arguably, the kind of spontaneous popular enthusiasm around “positive energy” seen 
in 2012 is already showing signs of subsiding (see Figure 1). As a discursive fad, it is 
also inevitable that “positive energy” will go out of fashion sooner or later, giving way 
to yet newer inventions.  
Secondly and theoretically, one important criticism that has been leveled at Laclau 
and Mouffe’s theory on discourse and hegemony suggests that it overstates the power 
of discursive rearticulation to bring about social change, and that it pays insufficient 
attention to the non-discursive dimensions to power relations or struggles.73 In present-
                                                        
73  Chouliaraki, Lilie, and Norman Fairclough. Discourse in Late Modernity. Vol. 2. Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 1999; see also Fairclough, Norman. Discourse and Social Change. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992. 
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day China, the promotion of “positive energy” has been supported by measures 
requiring explicit coercive state power, such as judicial silencing of vocal internet 
personalities who spoke of sensitive issues (i.e. “negative energy”).74 In other cases, 
massive state resources have been mobilized, such as the deployment of millions of 
internet commentators as well as student volunteers to spread “positive energy”.75 In 
other words, while the discursive intervention stigmatizes critical voices and labels 
them as “negative”, physical resources and forces are deployed to spread “positive 
energy” and cleanse “negative energy” from the Chinese mediasphere where the 
hegemonic struggle is played out. Discourse is not everything, and it does not operate 
in a purely symbolic space.  
 
Conclusion 
To conclude, in this paper, we documented and analyzed the ways in which the recent 
popular online expression “positive energy” was appropriated and promoted by the 
CCP party-state as an attempt of hegemonic intervention into public (especially online) 
discourse in China. Using Laclau and Mouffe’s theory on discourse and hegemony, we 
illustrated that the semantic versatility of the phrase allowed the authorities to use it to 
accomplish positive propaganda. Compared with previous hegemonic slogans 
promoted by the CCP party-state, this “positive energy” hegemonic intervention has 
achieved a notable degree of effectiveness.  
A key significance of this paper lies in providing a case study that went beyond 
the typical control-vs.-resistance narrative in the scholarship on Chinese 
internet/mediasphere which tends to accentuate antagonism and conflict. With the 
concept of hegemony, which is the dissolution of antagonism and manufacture of 
consent, this study showcased a different kind of politics of the internet in China. 
Furthermore, our findings suggest that it is simplistic to view the internet as necessarily 
weakening the capacity of an authoritarian state to intervene in public discourse; the 
state may adapt to, or learn to take advantage of, the new media environment.  
Nevertheless, we do not claim that the relative success of “positive energy” can be 
easily replicated in the future. As we have shown, the key to success is the alignment 
of meanings as articulated in grassroots participation out of intuitive human inclinations 
with those intended by the authorities for the purpose of regime legitimation. It is this 
alignment that makes possible the hegemonic intervention. Arguably, terms and 
catchphrases that can achieve such alignment would not be easy to find.  
Finally, we do not suggest that with “positive energy” the Chinese state has 
achieved anything near full media hegemony. In fact, we acknowledge that this 
hegemonic intervention has also met with some criticism and could well be a transient 
phenomenon, as most online discourses are in China’s fast evolving media and social 
landscapes. The Chinese party-state has long emphasized positive propaganda in the 
realm of media, arts and cultural production,76 and the case of “positive energy” is 
                                                        
74 E.g. the ‘Big V’ Charles Xue case; http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-24182336 
75https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/04/10/wanted-ten-million-chinese-students-to-
civilize-the-internet/ 
76 In China, such positive propaganda is also known as “main melody” (zhu xuanlu 主旋律), referring to cultural 
productions that disseminate regime ideologies and values, or “positive reporting” (zhengmian baodao正面报道) 
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largely in line of this pre-existing propaganda strategy. While “positive energy” may 
not represent a radically different approach towards propaganda and the governing of 
the internet in Xi Jinping era China, what was notable, indeed exceptional, about this 
hegemonic intervention is the manner in which the authoritarian state obtained a 












                                                        








































Figure 1. "Positive Energy" in major 
Chinese newspapers  (Jan 2000 - May 
2016)
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Table 1. Current “positive energy” in Chinese mediasphere - a three-level analysis 
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